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 Executive-Legislative Relations in Nigeria’s Presidential System: 
Issues and Prospects  
 
Jide Ibietan and Olaniyi Trust Ayodele
*
  
 
 
Abstract: This paper examines the issues and challenges inherent in 
executive-legislative relations in Nigeria’s presidential system with special 
focus on the Eight National Assembly of the Fourth Republic. The paper 
notes that cordial and symbiotic relations between these two arms of 
government are irreducible minimum requirements for entrenching robust 
participatory democracy and ultimately development. However, the above 
have not taken firm footing, due to the prevalence of acrimony, squabbles 
and perfidy in executive-legislative relations. Data for this study were 
collected from secondary sources, and the adoption of textual analysis 
invigorated the discussion, findings and recommendations. Among others, 
the paper canvasses the need for deliberate cultivation/deepening the culture 
of civic engagement, consensus building and respect for constitutional 
provisions and delineation of boundaries in political and governance spheres. 
Other recommendations proffered are capable of redressing the irritants and 
challenges observed.  
 
Keywords: executive, legislative, Nigeria, presidential, relations, system  
 
INTRODUCTION  
The executive-legislative relations are one of the many binaries in 
Political Science and Public Administration scholarship. Its 
philosophical and theoretical roots accrue to Baron de Montesquieu 
(1689-1755) through his celebrated essay on the Spirit of Laws 
(Anyim-Ben et al. 2017), in which he made a landmark exposition on 
the doctrine of Separation of Powers, and as Eme (2016) posits, this is 
more relevant to presidential systems.  
Executive-legislative relationship can pose serious threats or 
challenges to participatory democracy and ultimately development in 
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situations where the limits defined by the rules of engagement 
(constitution) are observed in the breach or taken for granted. 
Underlining the doctrine of separation of powers is the logic of 
adherence to responsibilities in which the legislature performs law 
making functions, the executive concerns itself with implementation 
and the judiciary adjudicates and interprets laws. The implication of 
this is that none of the arms of government should encroach on the 
powers of others and this reinforces the idea of checks and balances 
with the attributes of preventing autocratic governance or tyrannical 
rule, despotism and oppression (Kalu 2018). It is however pertinent to 
note and quite analogous to the age-old politics-administration 
(dichotomy) debate, that a rigid separation or compartmentalisation of 
legislative-executive relations may circumscribe or limit consensus-
building, rapport and entrenchment of democratic principles/practices, 
thus impacting badly on governance.  
It has been observed that in most presidential democratic systems, 
these vital organs of government are characterised by ‘cat and mouse’ 
relations or ‘hide and seek games’, conflict, cooperation, hostility and 
complicity in the exercise of political authority (Lafenwa and 
Oluwalogbon 2014), even when the ruling party has dominant 
membership in the bi-cameral legislature. This is particularly 
noticeable in 8
th
 National Assembly whose journey in 2015 according 
to Adisa (2017), started on an acrimonious note, arising from the desire 
of both legislative chambers to assert the cherished independence in 
choosing leaders, negating the much-touted party supremacy and 
latitude to impose leaders on the legislature.  
It is apposite to underscore the phenomenon of ‘strongman’ or 
Executive Leader with manifest tendencies of limiting the 
independence of legislative institutions dot not only Nigeria’s, but 
Africa’s political landscape, and constitutes a serious drag on and 
albatross to democratic environment. The executive arm becomes too 
powerful arising from prebendalism, through which it controls political 
agenda and behaviour of politicians via funding of political parties and 
candidature for elections. Eme (2016, 31) corroborates that “the 
institutions of political parties within and outside legislatures are often 
the instruments of contestations between the executive and the 
legislatures”. This argument stretches to include the assertiveness of 
the legislature and the risk of applying sanctions due to infractions 
against parties’ positions.  
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As a corollary, mention must be made of political party structures 
(that are hijacked and possibly located and controlled by the executive 
arm) often circumscribe the powers and functions of the legislature in 
Nigeria (Baba 2015), and this accounts for the preponderance of weak 
legislatures. This resonates from misconception on the part of a 
dominant executive in a presidential system that erroneously 
characterises the legislature as not only an appendage and rubber 
stamp, but a tool to legitimise or serve its whims and caprices, which 
sharply contrasts the logic of separation of powers.  
A synopsis of the major elements and irritants in executive-
legislative relations are: values and perspectives of governance; the 
major players; actions and institutions; legislative control and 
regulation of executive behaviours, otherwise known as oversight 
(Rockman in Bassey et al.2013). These would be discussed in details 
and broken into specifics in section four of this paper, with over-
arching objective of examining the issues and challenges in executive-
legislative relations in Nigeria’s presidential system, and proffering 
suggestions on improved and robust interaction that can deliver 
dividends of democracy plus developmental outcomes. The paper is 
structured as follows: Introduction; Method and Main Argument of the 
paper; Conceptual Discourse on the Executive arm, Legislature and 
Presidential System of Government; Discussion on Issues and 
Challenges in Nigeria’s Executive-Legislative Relations; 
Recommendations/Solutions and Conclusion.  
 
METHOD AND MAIN ARGUMENT OF THE PAPER  
This is a qualitative study with reliance on secondary sources of data, 
namely: books, journals, internet materials and the constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 as amended in 2011. The data were 
textually analysed, and these illuminate our understanding on the 
central themes of the paper, thus strengthening the discussion, findings 
and recommendations that followed.  
One major argument of this paper is that an entrenched culture of 
consensus building and symbiotic executive-legislative relations can 
temporise persistent friction, squabbles and acrimony between these 
two vital organs of government, and effectively neutralise the threats to 
robust presidential democratic practice and development. Additionally, 
the paper argues that the phenomenon of ‘strongman’ or ‘Maximum 
Executive Leader’ with authoritarian tendencies in civil governance 
and public affairs is a major albatross to democratic practice, with the 
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avoidable effect of generating combustible political environment. This 
calls for proactive reforms or restructuring to strengthen institutional 
safety guards as bulwark to chaotic democratic atmosphere and 
experience.  
 
CONCEPTUAL DISCOURSE  
The executive and legislative arms of government, as well as the 
presidential system of government and its application in Nigeria are 
explained in this section.  
 
The Executive Arm of Government  
The term ‘Executive’ has variegated uses, and depending on the 
context, it can be typologised into Authoritarian, Democratic, 
Presidential or Parliamentary executive. This paper is however 
interested in the taxonomy that situates the concept within the ambit of 
government, and it is responsible for policy and programme execution. 
The political connotation, especially as underscored in presidential 
systems encapsulates Ministers and senior government’s officials 
appointed and headed by the President, and public officers at federal, 
state and local government levels (Igbokwe-Ibeto & Anazodo 2015).  
To be sure, Mclean and McMillan (2003, 186) argue that the 
principle of separation of powers imply that “presidential authority is 
constrained by a separately elected congress and … independent 
judiciary whose duty is to see that executive action is not contrary to 
the articles of the constitution”. Although, these authors posit further 
that presidential government is characterised by decentralised decision-
making within the executive arm, it is arguable if the unitaristic and 
centralising tendencies in the guise of federal practice makes this a 
reality in Nigeria.  
There is a solid constitutional base for the Executive arm of 
government in Nigeria, and this branch is headed by the President. The 
following sections of the constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigerian (FRN), 1999 as amended in 2011 corroborate this position; 
Chapter VI – The Executive, Part 1 deals with the Federal Executive 
thus: Section 130 establishes the office of President, Section 141- 
office of the Vice-President; section 147 – Ministers of Federal 
Government; Section 150: Attorney-General of the Federation; Section 
153 – Establishment of Administrative Institutions or Federal 
Executive Bodies; Section 169 is devoted to Civil Service of the 
Federation. Part II of this chapter of the Constitution made provisions 
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for the Executive of each state of the federation thus: Sections 176 and 
186 establish the offices of Governor and Deputy Governor 
respectively. Section 195 refers to the Office of Attorney General of a 
state, while section 197 listed some state commissions/administrative 
bodies. Section 206 provides for the establishment of state civil 
service.  
In buttressing the locus and robustness of the executive arm in 
Nigeria, Lafenwa and Oluwalogbon (2014, 75) aver that it is “the most 
persistent and enduring organ…that gives effect to the will of the state 
by enforcing or executing or implementing the laws and policies”. This 
view converges with those of Mclean and McMillan (2003) on the 
policy execution functions of this branch of government. The features 
of the executive arm typified above with reference to Nigeria is 
reinforced by the inevitability and support accorded by the public 
administration machinery to governance in almost three decades of 
military rule and the precarious thirty-month civil war period.  
Explicating the term executive further, Igbokwe-Ibeto and Anazodo 
(2015, 16) document that it is the organ “charged with the 
implementation and enforcement of laws …policies, and the 
administration of public affairs”. This position was strengthened with 
an allusion to the executive functions of running the machinery of 
government, policy formulation, evaluation and execution, in order to 
achieve pre-determined and publicly declared objectives (Waldo, in 
Ibietan 2014). The reference to law enforcement above is reminiscent 
of the traditional security functions of public administration, which 
was pejoratively christened “night watchman” (Adamolekun 1983).  
In their contributions, Obidimma and Obidimma (2015) exemplify 
the executive as the arm of government responsible for effectuating 
administrative laws enacted by the legislature. This view adds the 
dimension of executive-legislative interface to the conceptual 
discourse and the need for synergy as cross-cutting the activities or 
relations of these two important organs of government. It is therefore 
not surprising that Lafenwa and Oluwalogbon (2014, 91) affirm that 
“none can operate effectively without the cooperation of the other”, 
while Na’aba (2018) urges the two arms to cultivate harmonious 
working relationship.  
 
The Concept of Legislature/Legislative Arm of Government 
There is consensus or unanimity in the documentation by scholars that 
legislature as a term enjoys synonymous or interchangeable use with 
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words like Parliament, National Assembly and Congress (Fashagba et 
al. 2014; Ibietan, Igariwey and Ujara 2017). Legislature as a concept 
has been operationalised as “a law-making assembly of elected 
members in a formally equal relationship to one another” (Mclean and 
McMillan 2003, 305). These authors traced the evolution of legislature 
to medieval bodies assembled by kings to exact taxation, and they sat 
more or less continuously, while its modern form is traceable to the 
works of John Locke on parliaments.  
The 1999 Constitution of FRN (as amended in 2011) accords 
recognition, if not prominence and pre-eminence to the legislature. 
Copious references to this are contained in the under listed sections. 
Chapter V of the constitution is devoted to the legislature. Part 1 of this 
chapter heralds the National Assembly, with sections 47, 48, 49, 50 
and 51giving legal backing to the establishment of National Assembly; 
Composition of the Senate; House of Representatives; Senate President 
and Speaker of the House of Representatives; and Staff of National 
Assembly respectively. Part II of this chapter chronicles House of 
Assembly of a state, with sections 90, 91, 92 and 93 dealing with 
establishment of House of Assembly; Speaker of the House; and Staff 
of the House of Assembly respectively. Sections 80 and 120 accord the 
National Assembly and State Houses of Assembly power and control 
over public funds. This issue often constitutes a source of acrimony 
and conflict between the executive and legislature in situations devoid 
of caution and understanding. Detailed discussion on this is reserved 
for section four of this paper.  
Bassey et al. (2013, 181) explicate that the legislature is “a body 
which promulgates laws…authenticates and legitimises commands as 
to what citizens of a state can do or cannot do”. This view underscores 
not only the law making function of the legislative arm of government, 
but as representatives of the people with responsibilities of 
encouraging civic engagement and commitment to the ideals and tenets 
of democracy (Ibietan and Ajayi, 2015). Nwaubani (2014) furthers the 
position taken by Bassey et al. (2013) that legislative functions are 
directed at ensuring quality policymaking, accountability and good 
governance via robust checks and acting as a brake on executive 
absolutism or tyranny in public governance. These highlight the 
administrative and financial responsibility dimensions or 
responsiveness of the legislature, which forms the essence of 
Montesquieu’s treatise on spirit of laws.  
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Fashagba et al. (2014) underscore not only the foregoing functions 
as being applicable to the Nigerian bi-cameral legislature but traces the 
evolution of the legislative institution to the 1922 Clifford constitution, 
highlighting the specifics and nuances of that era which reflected 
colonial interests in the main. The authors illuminate our 
understanding through a comparison that arguably believes that 
legislatures in presidential democracies play more significant roles in 
policy formulation than those in parliamentary systems. These roles, 
according to Ibietan & Itodo (2015) and Ibietan et al. (2017, 158) are 
germane to “stabilizing the polity and integrating the society…”  
 
Presidential System of Government  
Scholars are wont to agreeing that a presidential system of government 
is one that presents a leader called Executive President combining the 
offices and functions of Head of State and Head of Government. Such 
a leader possesses and exercises real executive powers. Anyebe (2016) 
refers to the leader in a presidential system as a monocephalous 
executive, owing to the enormity of power he/she wields and the wide 
latitudes of discretion in the execution of assignments. Aminu (2006, 
1) asserts that “Nigeria runs a presidential system which in structure 
and theory of operations is almost identical to that of the United 
States”. Curiously, this author adds that “the system was not adopted… 
to strengthen democracy or…empower the legislature and the 
legislator”. The Nigerian practice of presidentialism, despite being 
akin to that of America, presents different environment and operators, 
thus the experience and results are not the same.  
In addition to the above characterisation of presidentialism and its 
features in Nigeria, Carpizo (2007), building on earlier scholars, 
documents other attributes as follows: the president/executive arm is 
independent of the legislature and vice versa; the president has the 
power of appointing people or Cabinet Ministers to certain positions; 
the Executive can appeal directly to the people through plebiscites and 
referendums (although, not much of this has been experienced in 
Nigeria); the president can be removed (if he commits impeachable 
offences) through a numerical super-legislative majority; the president 
can initiate executive bills and through the public bureaucracy prepare 
national budgets which are forwarded to the legislature for 
consideration and approval as Appropriation Act; the people elect the 
president and expect him/her to lead them. Members of the legislature 
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are also elected as representatives of the people, thus underscoring the 
notion of dual democratic legitimacy.  
The ascendancy of presidential system of government and 
constitution was necessitated by the perceived weaknesses and failings 
of the 1963 Republican constitution in Nigeria. This was based on 
parliamentary system that thrives on various power loci, viewed as not 
appropriate for the traditional patterns and complex social structures of 
Nigeria (and Africa), and ultimately led to the collapse of the First 
Republic in 1966. So, effectively the 1979 constitution ushered 
presidentialism (Kifordu, 2013) into the Nigerian governance 
architecture. The incursion of military into governance and public 
administration after the first coup and its post-second republic return in 
Muheeb’s (2016) view “required a presidency that could stabilize the 
polity”. It must be noted that this averment is an indirect inference or 
suggestion for a ‘strongman’, instead of capable and robust institutions 
of governance. However, Fagbadebo and Francis (2016, 5) counter that 
scholarly perspectives on presidentialism implies that “power relation 
between the executive and … legislature determines the outcome of 
governance, the location and control of power is essential in order to 
avert the danger of authoritarianism” in a separated, but shared power 
system.  
The colonial administrative style coupled with military hangover 
and its unitary principles/practices account for concentrated power in 
the executive arm and by extension, centralised presidential system in 
Nigeria. The foregoing narrative, Gbajabiamila (2018, 4) opines 
“cannot be suitable in a multi-ethnic society like Nigeria where there 
are issues of marginalisation, resource control, power sharing… 
revenue allocation, agitation for secession…”  
By constitutional design, the Nigerian governance system is 
presidential, but in practice (and resulting from factors identified 
above), it is unitary. This partly explains the nationality question, 
occasioned by serial crises, and has circumscribed the strength and 
bases for adopting federalism in Nigeria, which are: cultural and ethnic 
diversity; fear of majoritarian domination of the minority; geographical 
and economic factors; and bringing governmental power closer to the 
people. Correcting these maladies or dysfunctions would require 
modifications or hybrid approaches to the model and system of 
governance in Nigeria.  
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DISCUSSION: ISSUES AND CHALLENGES IN NIGERIA’S 
EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE RELATIONS  
An appropriate starting point for this section necessarily reconnects 
with the overarching issues mentioned in section one of this paper on 
the knotty issues underlining executive-legislative relations in Nigeria. 
The components and irritants are however highlighted and discussed 
specifically hereunder.  
The legislature is empowered constitutionally on appropriation 
(budget) matters. Sections 80 and 81 among others accord the National 
Assembly powers and control over public funds. For instance, section 
81 provides that budget estimates (appropriation bill) shall be 
presented to each chamber or joint sitting of the National Assembly at 
any time within the financial year. Experience shows that the president 
presents this instrument before the commencement of the financial 
year, and it could take up to six months for the legislature to complete 
the process and produce an Appropriation Act. This inevitably slows 
down budget implementation and other programmes. Section 82 
therefore provides the executive arm a leeway to bifurcate the 
dominant claim on power of appropriation by the legislature (Adisa 
2017).  
A related issue to the above in the public domain is the recurring 
habit of the legislature in tinkering with the budget, which in Nigerian 
parlance refers to ‘budget padding’. This is usually construed as an 
affront on the executive, and as Igbokwe-Ibeto and Anazodo (2015, 
19) argue, “the legislature has always been painted as… mutilating the 
budget after the executive has ‘painstakingly’ prepared it”. Had the 
legislature also not been shrouding its budget in secrecy, the 
convincing and altruistic bases for the action of the legislators is that 
budget belongs to citizens, and they owe it as paramount duty to ensure 
that the budget meets the yearnings and aspirations of the people as 
their bona fide representatives. However, allegations of self-
centeredness, avarice and serial acts of corruption circumscribe this 
position.  
Another issue worthy of note is executive interference and 
meddlesomeness in the affairs of the legislature which finds expression 
in attempts at controlling the National Assembly through deliberate 
manipulation in selection/election of its leadership. This was 
particularly noticeable under the Obasanjo presidency between 1999 
and 2007, when there were five senate presidents in quick succession 
(Anyim-Ben et al. 2017, 82). This portrays lack of respect for 
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legislative independence which is attributable to the president’s 
overbearing attitude and style of leadership (Nwaubani, 2014) 
inherited from his military background and dominant persona.  
The 8
th
 National Assembly had its share of derailment in legislative 
initiatives, perhaps not of deep-seated nature as highlighted above, 
because President Buhari at the inception of his administration in 2015 
did not show overt interest in the emergence of leaders at National 
Assembly. Aziken (2019, 3) avers however that “not all around him 
were apparently of the same mind… Hence, the brouhaha that 
followed the emergence of the Bukola Saraki and Ike Ekweremadu 
leadership of the senate and… Speaker Yakubu Dogara in the House of 
Representatives”. This phenomenon or what appears as executive 
dominance and attempts at harassing the legislature has entrenched 
basis/support in literature as documented in Eme (2016); Ihemeje, et.al 
(2016); Fagbadebo and Francis (2016); and Na’aba (2018) among 
others.  
It is also pertinent to identify the widening gulf between legislative 
structures and presidential aides on National Assembly (NASS). 
Robust relationship between these two groups has the tendency of 
strengthening executive-legislative interaction through proper 
guidance, advice, eliminating suspicions and reducing frictions. It is 
puzzling but quite revealing as Adisa (2017, 7) submits thus:  
 
recently…some representatives of the executive appear to speak and act 
as though they were expressly directed by the president. They exhibit 
attitude that creates suspicion between the arms of government and 
claim knowledge of issues they really lack knowledge about. They tend 
to hijack the functions of the clerk during joint sitting and show 
overbearing conduct during screening of candidates at the senate 
committees.  
 
The allusion to screening of candidates highlighted above resonates 
as an important function/responsibility of the legislature, which 
Hassan (2016, 1) reinforces this way: “…confirmation of nominated 
ministers, ambassadors and heads of parastatals”. In this 
connection, the Magu (Acting Chairman of EFCC) case presents a 
dramatised scenario on executive-legislative face-off in the 8
th
 
Assembly, and as Isa (2017, 2) posits, the legislature allegedly 
stood “on the side of an institution” (which is the Directorate of 
State Service), thus declining the confirmation of appointment as 
constitutionally required.  
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Equally worthy of mention is the unhealthy relationship 
bothering on political issues between state governors and some 
members of NASS from states like Kaduna, Kogi, Zamfara and 
Bauchi who were experiencing ruptured relationships with their 
governors and the president was perceived as tacitly endorsing the 
actions of the respective governors (The Guardian, 2018). This 
constitutes one of the thorny issues characterising executive-
legislative relations in the 8
th
 Assembly of the Fourth Republic. 
Other issues include the alleged overzealous acts of the former 
Inspector General Police who held some principal officers and key 
members of the 8
th
 Assembly (especially the senate) in derision, 
contempt and disrespect. Until tenure severed him from that office, 
the president appeared helpless and unable to call this public officer 
to order. The damage occasioned by his acts is public knowledge 
and drew a wedge on executive-legislative relations. Sundry issues 
like untimely release of funds for the execution of constituency 
projects due to lawmakers by the executive; constitutional 
responsibility of oversight functions as mechanism for ensuring 
accountability and good governance (Igbokwe-Ibeto and Anazodo 
2015); refusal to assent to bills/exercise of veto power (Kalu 2018) 
among others cannot be ignored.  
To recap, apart from the perceived weaknesses/unsuitability of 
parliamentary system for the Nigerian cum African political 
environment as highlighted in this paper, and which arguably led to 
the collapse of the First Republic, the scorecard on the Second 
Republic by Fashagba et al. (2014, 103) is that the legislature of that 
era “was pliant, … failed to check abuse of executive power…and 
the adversarial or confrontational politics that resulted following the 
collapse of the NPN/NPP alliance…” may  have accounted for the 
abrupt end of that republic in 1983. The Third Republic by 
knowledgeable accounts was still birthed, due to the nature of 
events in that period.  
Extant literature presents the Yar’adua and Jonathan presidencies 
as performing fairly well in executive-legislative relations 
(Okoroma 2012; Lafenwa and Oluwalogbon 2014). The law-
making arm has nonetheless been able to protect democratic ideals 
by ensuring law, order and constitutionalism, especially through the 
landmark and dependable roles exhibited in times of political crisis 
and uncertainty. A case in point was the nationalistic exercise of the 
“doctrine of necessity” in 2010 to forestall anarchy and 
Jide Ibietan and Olaniyi Trust Ayodele 
294 
 
constitutional crisis as a result of President Yar’adua’s ill-health, 
and later demise. This doctrine paved way for Vice-President 
Goodluck Jonathan to be sworn in as Acting President and finally as 
President, consequent upon the death of Umaru Yar’adua (Okoroma 
2012; Nwaubani 2014).  
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
The paper expounds on the intellectual and theoretical foundations 
of executive-legislative relations, particularly in presidential 
systems, and as entrenching separation of powers among arms of 
government. It further notes that persistent friction, squabbles and 
acrimony between the executive and legislature are threats to 
democracy and development (Ibietan & Joshua 2015). There is an 
observation on the debilitating effect of colonial administrative 
style; the adoption of parliamentary system of government in the 
first republic; the inordinate appetite for power/governance by the 
military coupled with their unitary command structure. These in no 
small measure impacted badly on political activities and 
presidentialism which has become unnecessarily centralised in 
Nigeria.  
The constitutional bases, provisions and position on arms of 
government in Nigeria are clearly articulated, yet there are issues 
and irritants in the executive-legislative relations as sections of this 
paper show. As earlier noted, the presidential system that is 
operational in Nigeria is a direct transplant of the American model; 
however the environment and operators are not the same. It must be 
reiterated that the USA system has evolved and developed 
substantially, and this implies that there may be lessons in 
adaptation that Nigeria needs to learn as a matter of urgency, in 
order to better cultivate and sustain presidential system and practice. 
Other suggestions capable of addressing issues and challenges 
inherent in executive-legislative relations are as follows:  
 
- The need for synergy, collaboration, robust dialogue and better 
relationship between arms of government, especially the 
executive and legislature cannot be overemphasised in the overall 
interest of citizens. This, in no small measure will facilitate the 
delivery of the much needed democratic dividends.  
- Respect for constitutional provisions and boundaries (of 
activities) must be adequately taken into cognizance, and the 
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independence of each arm of government should be the hallmark 
of democratic practice and interaction. 
- Through a deliberate cultivation of the culture of civic 
engagement and accountability from public office holders, 
Nigerians must continue to demand qualitative services, 
performance and moral rectitude in public governance. These 
would strengthen public institutions and set higher 
qualifications/expectations from entrants into the political space.  
- Notwithstanding the dismal experience with twenty years of 
unbroken civilian administration, Nigerians must relentlessly 
make the sacrifice and take required steps to further deepen 
democratic practice.  
- As a corollary, Nigeria’s democratic practice and governance do 
not require “strongmen” to run, but leaders and political elites 
that are purposeful and service-driven.  
- Additionally, a clear understanding and application of 
restructuring to decongest the central government, and ensuring 
that every Nigerian finds a rightful stake in the Nigerian project 
would greatly address the ticklish ‘nationality question’ in the 
country, and the unitaristic inclination of federal system of 
governance.  
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